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CIVIL RIGHTS-No Private Attorney General
Exception to the American Rule in New Mexico: New
Mexico Right to ChooseNationalAbortion Rights Action League
v. Johnson
I. INTRODUCTION
In New Mexico Right to Choose/National Abortion Rights Action League v.
William Johnson (Johnson 11),' the New Mexico Supreme Court refused to adopt the
private attorney general doctrine, which allows a party who prevailed on a state
constitutional rights claim to recover attorney's fees.2 The court held that adoption
of the private attorney general doctrine would not be consistent with New Mexico's
strict adherence to the American rule and its policies
Part II of this Note begins with a factual description of the Johnson case. Part III
discusses the historical background of the American rule and the private attorney
general doctrine in American courts. Finally, part IV analyzes the Johnson court's
reasoning and explores the implications of this decision on the future of litigation
regarding state constitutional rights in New Mexico.
H. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiffs in this case prevailed in the district court when they challenged a
Human Services Department regulation restricting the use of Medicaid funds to pay
for abortions. The district court decision was appealed and was affirmed by the New
Mexico Supreme Court in a groundbreaking application of New Mexico's Equal
Rights Amendment in New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson (Johnson
1).4 The New Mexico Supreme Court held that the Department's regulation violated
New Mexico's Equal Rights Amendment "because it result[ed] in a program that
does not apply the same standard of medical necessity to both men and women, and
there is no compelling justification for treatinf men and women differently with
respect to their medical needs in this instance."
1. 127 N.M. 654, 986 P.2d 450(1999).
2. Id. at 662, 986 P.2d at 458.
3. Id.
4. 126 N.M. 788, 791, 975 P.2d 841, 844 (1998), cert. denied, Klecan v. New Mexico Right to
Choose/NARAL, 526 U.S. 1020 (1999). The regulation prohibited the use of state funds to pay for abortions for
Medicaid-eligible women except when necessary to (1) save the life of the mother, (2) to end an ectopic pregnancy,
or (3) when the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest. The district court permanently enjoined the Secretary of
Human Services from enforcing this rule. Under the district court's order, the Human Services Department "must
allow the use of state funds to pay for abortions for Medicaid-eligible women when they are medically necessary."
Id. at 791, 975 P.2d at 844. The Secretary of Human Services appealed the district court's decision and the court
of appeals certified the appeal to the New Mexico Supreme Court because the issue presented a significant question
of law under the New Mexico Constitution. Id at 791, 975 P.2d at 844.
5. 126 N.M. at 791, 975 P.2d at 844. The New Mexico Supreme Court upheld the district court's decision
based on the Equal Rights Amendment of the New Mexico State Constitution. Id. at 798, 975 P.2d at 851 (citing
N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18 "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor
shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws. Equality of rights under law shall not be denied on account
of the sex of any person."). See also Linda M. Vanzi, Freedom at Home: State Constitutions and Medicaid Funding
for Abortions, 26 N.M. L. REV. 433, 452-53 (1996) (discussing how states and the federal government have dealt
with Medicaid funding of abortions).
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After succeeding on the merits in the district court, the plaintiffs moved for an
award of attorney's fees under both the private attorney general doctrine and the bad
faith exceptions to the American rule.' The trial court denied the motion and its
denial was challenged on cross-appeal, which was stayed by the supreme court
pending resolution of the merits.' After entry of its opinion in Johnson 1, the New
Mexico Supreme Court accepted briefs from the parties and ruled on the issue of
attorney's fees. That ruling, Johnson II, is the subject of this Note.8
In Johnson II, the plaintiffs argued only that the New Mexico Supreme Court
should adopt the private attorney general doctrine exception to the American rule,
which would allow private plaintiffs' attorneys to recover fees in cases where, as a
result of their efforts, state constitutional rights are protected to the benefit of a large
number of people.9 This was the first consideration of the private attorney general
doctrine in New Mexico. The New Mexico Supreme Court ruled against the
plaintiffs and refused to adopt the private attorney general doctrine for New
Mexico.' o
I. BACKGROUND
A. The American Rule
The history of the American rule regarding attorney's fees is infused with
arguments underlying the theory of American democracy. The American rule, where
the losing party in litigation is not liable for the winner's fees, was introduced in the
earliest days of the founding of the United States in opposition to the English rule,
where the losing party pays the winner's fees." It is believed that the American rule
reflects the "spirit of individualism in frontier societies" by encouraging-open access
to courts and not deterring wronged parties from filing suit because of the risk of
having to pay opposing parties' attorney's fees if unsuccessful. 2 Recent court
decisions have justified continued adherence to the American rule for three main
reasons.' 3 First, courts explain that since litigation is risky, a party should not be
penalized for participating in a lawsuit.'4 Second, courts fear that the poor would be
disproportionately affected by fee shifting because they have more to lose if forced
to pay their opponents' legal fees." Finally, some courts have determined that court
6. See discussion of the private attorney general doctrine and bad faith exceptions infra parts II.B.2 and
3.
7. 126 N.M. at 793, 975 P.2d at 846.
8. 127 N.M 654, 986 P.2d at 450.
9. 127 N.M. at 657, 986 P.2d at 453.
10. 127 N.M. at 663, 986 P.2d at 459.
11. See Dan B. Dobbs, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.10(1), at 387-89 (2d ed. 1993). See also Arcambel v.
Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 306 (1796) (showing that the American rule was well established early in America's
history). Cf. Edward F. Sherman, From "Loser Pays" to Modified Offer of Judgment Rules: Reconciling Incentives
to Settle with Access to Justice, 76 TEX. L REV. 1863, 1871-72 (1998) (critiquing courts' continued adherence to
the American rule and suggesting adoption of a modified English rule to ameliorate the English rule's effects on
indigent litigants and the access to the courts issue).
12. Sherman, supra note 11, at 1863-64.
13. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714,718 (1967) (explaining American
courts' continued reliance on the American rule).
14. Id. at718.
15. Id.
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costs required in order to determine appropriate fee awards burden judicial
processes, since the courts must review evidence regarding time spent on cases and
reasonable fee calculations.' The American rule, therefore, is rooted in public
policies that are important to America's legal history. 7
B. Exceptions to the American Rule
Despite this strong attachment to the American rule, a prevailing party can obtain
fee awards in American courts if allowed by legislation (statutory exceptions) or
equitable court doctrines. Fee shifting statutes exist at both the federal and state
levels, usually apply only to prevailing plaintiffs, and have been enacted primarily
to provide an incentive for people to protect a statutory or constitutional right."
Courts also use equitable doctrines to award attorney's fees to punish bad faith
behavior or when litigation protects a common fund, and some courts award
attorney's fees when a party litigates to protect public interests or constitutional
rights.
1. Statutory Exceptions
At the federal level, fee-shifting provisions have been included in many diverse
statutes such as the Freedom of Information Act 9 and the Fair Labor Standards
Act.2" The primary federal fee shifting statute is the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act.2' Passed in 1976, section 1988 awards fees for successful suits under
the civil rights statutes, primarily under section 1983, against the state or a person
acting under the authority of state law.22 In passing section 1988, Congress
recognized the importance of attorney fee awards in encouraging access to the courts
for federal civil rights litigation.' In cases combining section 1983 and state law
claims, the approved federal practice is to award attorney's fees pursuant to section
1988, as long as plaintiff's section 1983 claims are substantial.2 While some state
courts follow the generous federal practice of awarding fees even when the plaintiff
16. id.
17. Sherman, supra note 11, at 1863-64. Supporters of the English rule argue that it discourages the bringing
of frivolous lawsuits and that the disparate impact of the English rule is lessened with free legal aid and tax laws
that reduce the burden on the losing party. Id. at 1871-72. Similarly, if a litigant is poor, and in effect "judgment
proof," the risk of having to pay another party's attorney's fees may not be a deterrent to bringing the suit. Id. at
1872. Nevertheless, the "access to the courts" policy is so embedded in the American rule that it is almost always
considered by courts when they are faced with arguments for adopting American rule exceptions.
18. Sherman, supra note 11, at 1866.
19. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1994).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1998).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994). See discussion infra part II.B.3.
22. The relevant portion of 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), provides: "In any action or proceeding to enforce a
provision of sections 1981, 1981(a), 1982, 1983, 1985 and 1986 of this title...the court, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."
23. The purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is "to promote compliance with civil rights legislation by enabling
citizens to bring civil rights claims and by encouraging attorneys to accept such cases." Section 1988 has been
applied broadly: See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 11 (1980) (holding that the fee provision is part of the section
1983 remedy whether the action is brought in federal or state court.); Williams v. Hanover Housing Authority, 113
F.3d 1294, 1299 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that prevailing parties were entitled to attorney's fees under section 1988
even though the grounds on which they won rested on state rather than federal grounds).
24. See Jennifer Friesen, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: UTIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS, AND
DEFENSES I 10.01, at 10-3 (2d ed. 1995).
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has succeeded on state law grounds, other state courts reject the section 1988 claim
for fees if the federal claim was left unadjudicated or was rejected. 2
A plaintiff in state court without federal claims may still recover attorney's fees
through state fee shifting provisions or statutes. For example, New Mexico provides
for attorney's fees in its Human Rights Act and in statutes governing unfair trade
practices and insurance bad faith claims.2" Massachusetts and Connecticut also have
fee-shifting provisions in their civil rights acts allowing claims for narrowly defined
classes of litigants, and Oregon has an independent fee shifting statute that provides
fees for narrowly defined constitutional claims.27 California has a broad independent
fee shifting statute that makes fees available in any case "result[ing] in the
enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest."28 Some state statutes
also allow prevailing defendants to recover attorney's fees, however these instances
are usually limited to frivolous or bad faith claims. 29 By enacting fee-shifting
provisions to encourage litigation, state legislators have been able to choose which
statutory rights and policies warrant greater protection. In cases without statute-
based claims, litigants must turn to the court's equitable common law powers for fee
awards.
2. General Equitable Common Law Exceptions
All states recognize equitable doctrines giving courts authority to adopt
exceptions to the American rule and award fees absent a statutory provision.30 One
of these doctrines is the bad faith exception, where either party to a lawsuit can
recover attorney's fees when the other party acts "in bad faith, vexatiously,
wantonly, or for oppressive reasons" in the course of the litigation. 3' -Awarding
attorney's fees under this exception serves to punish and deter bad faith behavior,
and therefore keeps the courts open to those who bring suits against parties who may
25. Id. For example, in Chapman v. Luna, 102 N.M. 768, 770,701 P.2d 367, 369 (1985) plaintiffs were not
entitled to attorney's fees under section 1988 when they did not specifically plead a federal equal protection or
section 1983 claim and prevailed on state constitutional grounds.
26. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-1-13(D) (1978) (Human Rights Act); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-10(c) (1978)
(Unfair Trade Practices); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-16-30 (1978) (Insurance Bad Faith). The New Mexico Human
Rights Act is much more limited than the federal Civil Rights Statutes because it only applies to discriminatory
practices by persons, employers, and other entities on the basis of "race, age, religion, color, national origin,
ancestry, sex, physical or mental handicap or serious medical condition." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (1978). It does
not apply to causes of action arising under the New Mexico Constitution, such as equal protection or due process
claims, and thus is not a substitute for the full protection of civil rights provided for by the federal Civil Rights
Statutes.
27. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-58 (West 1995) (attorney's fees allowed in action for injury to person
or property that arises out of a deprivation of rights secured by the Connecticut Constitution on account of
membership in named protected classes); Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, § 1 1(1)
(West 1996) (allowing fees for plaintiffs in cases where state constitutional rights have been violated by threats,
intimidation, or coercion); OR. REV. STAT. § 20.107 (1988) (providing for prevailing party attorney's fees in cases
involving discrimination under state statute, regulation, or state constitutional provision).
28. Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 1021.5 (1980). See private attorney general doctrine discussed infra part III.C.3.
29. Friesen, supra note 24, 10.02, at 10-6.
30. Friesen, supra note 24, 1 10.03, at 10-6 to 10-9.
31. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973) (explaining the use of the bad faith doctrine in federal courts). See also
State v. Baca, 120 N.M. 1, 6,9,896 P.2d 1148, 1153, 1156 (1995) (explaining New Mexico's long-time recognition
of the bad faith exception to the American rule).
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be inclined to that sort of behavior.32 The United States Supreme Court has adopted
the bad faith doctrine for federal courts in order to vindicate judicial authority
without the more drastic sanctions of contempt of court and to make the prevailing
party whole for expenses caused by the opponent's bad faith actions.33
Most states also allow attorney's fees under the common fund, substantial benefit,
and private attorney general doctrines. The common fund doctrine was recognized
in the United States as early as 1881 and has been adopted by almost every state.34
It allows attorney's fees to be awarded from a common fund when a party with
established rights to the fund litigates in order to preserve the fund. Some examples
include class actions for money damages and suits protecting trust funds,
corporations, and estates. This doctrine explicitly encourages access to the courts to
protect the interests of parties who may not otherwise be able to protect their portion
of the common fund. It has a restitutionary purpose since the people who share in
the fund would be unjustly enriched if they received benefits without paying fees.35
An extension of the common fund doctrine is the substantial benefit doctrine,
where attorney's fees are recoverable from persons who share in a non-monetary
benefit.36 Since these benefits are intangible, the fee award is generally applied to
the defendant, who then passes on the costs to the benefited group indirectly through
membership fees or reduced dividends for shareholders.37
3. The Private Attorney General Exception
Another equitable attorney fee doctrine is the private attorney general doctrine,
where plaintiffs recover attorney's fees when their litigation protects important
societal interests. The private attorney general exception to the American rule is
different from the substantial benefit doctrine in that a party acting as a private
attorney general protects public interests or constitutional rights for society in
general, while the substantial benefit doctrine establishes or protects rights of a
limited group. Like the substantial benefit doctrine, the payment of fees under the
private attorney general doctrine is imposed on the defendant, generally the state or
32. Sherman, supra note 11. at 1866.
33. Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991) (explaining that the federal courts allow recovery of
attorney's fees where a party has perpetrated a fraud on the court or has interfered with the litigation).
34. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. (15 Otto) 527, 532-33 (1881) (adopting the common fund doctrine);
Johnny Parker, The Common Fund Doctrine: Coming ofAge in the Law of Insurance Subrogation, 31 IND. L REV.
313, 337 (1998) (noting that all states except New Hampshire and Wyoming have adopted the doctrine).
35. Dobbs, supra note !1, § 3.10(2), at 395. Beneficiaries are not required to accept the benefit, and therefore
the common fund rule does not violate the restitution rule that "one person may not foist a benefit upon another and
then demand payment, because to do so would interfere with the recipient's rights of choice and self-determination."
ICE
36. Id. § 3.10(2), at 396. See, e.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. at 8-9 (explaining that a union member who
successfully sued to retain his membership in the union after being expelled for comments made against the
leadership established free speech rights for union members generally and therefore the membership should share
in paying fees).
37. Dobbs, supra note 11, § 3.10(2), at 396-97. While the substantial benefit doctrine might seem to apply
in constitutional litigation like Johnson 11 where a group shares in a non-monetary benefit, that claim was not made
in Johnson 11, and the doctrine was subsequently rejected by the New Mexico Supreme Court in American Civil
Liberties Union of New Mexico v. City of Albuquerque, 128 N.M. 315, 325,992 P.2d 866 (1999) (refusing to adopt
the substantial benefit doctrine where plaintiffs prevailed on state constitutional and statutory grounds on a
challenge of the city's juvenile curfew ordinance and safe teen operation program).
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a large public entity, who then passes on the cost of the attorney fee award to the
benefited people through taxes or increased fees. 38 Despite the similarities between
the private attorney general and other equitable exceptions to the American rule, the
private attorney general exception is unique in its relationship to public policy issues
and state constitutional rights. Courts confronted with the question of adopting the
private attorney general exception have struggled with the question of whether to
foster the judicial value of encouraging state constitutional and public interest
litigation, or to defer to the special legislative responsibility to decide under what
circumstances, if any, public funds should be used to fund litigation against the
state. The exception has received disparate treatment in the states that have
considered it and of those states most have rejected it, some have adopted it on state
constitutional grounds, and one state has adopted it for cases protecting public
interests in general.39
Led by a key United States Supreme Court decision, most courts considering the
private attorney general exception have been unwilling to use their equitable powers
to adopt it. In 1975, the United States Supreme Court in Alyeska Pipeline Service
Co. v. Wilderness Society rejected the private attorney general doctrine in the federal
courts.' In this case, the plaintiffs prevailed in a suit to bar construction of the trans-
Alaska oil pipeline and were awarded attorney's fees under the private attorney
general exception, which at that time was widely recognized by federal district
courts.4 On appeal, the Supreme Court reasoned that since Congress allows
attorney's fees under certain circumstances and has set out these exceptions to the
American rule in statutes, federal courts may not create new exceptions based on
public policy without legislative guidance.42 The Court feared that allowing the
judiciary to make such awards would leave them free to
fashion drastic new rules with respect to the allowance of attorneys' fees to the
prevailing party.. .or to pick and choose among plaintiffs and the statutes under
which they sue and to award fees in some cases but not in others, depending on
the courts' assessment of the importance of the public policies involved in
particular cases.43
Thus, the Court decided that it was best that Congress determine which public
interests deserve the award of attorney's fees in order to further the protection of
those interests."
In response, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act to
ensure that prevailing plaintiffs would be able to recover attorney's fees in civil
38. Dobbs, supra note 1I, § 3.10(2), at 398. Without the ability to pass on the fees, the unjust enrichment
to the public would not be properly remedied-it would only be paid by the defendant who would then have no
claim against the public. Therefore, the private attorney general and the substantial benefit doctrines have generally
not been applied to individual defendants. Id. at 396-401. But see discussion of Arizona's treatment of the private
attorney general doctrine infra this section.
39. See Appendix infra.
40. 421 U.S. 240, 269-71 (1975).
41. Id. at 241.
42. Id. at 269.
43. Id. at 269.
44. Id. at 269.
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rights cases.45 Following the Supreme Court's reasoning in Alyeska, several states
have explicitly refused to adopt the private attorney general exception.46 For
example, the opinion of the Connecticut Supreme Court in Doe v. Heintz, where the
facts mirror Johnson II, illustrates how state courts have accepted the Alyeska
holding.47 In an earlier judgment in that case, a regulation restricting state funding
of abortions for indigent women was declared invalid under the Connecticut
Constitution.48 The state supreme court then rejected plaintiff's plea for a fee award,
holding that allowing attorney's fees when a private litigant has "at substantial cost
to himself succeeded in enforcing a significant social policy that may benefit others"
was a legislative prerogative.49
In contrast, California rejected the Alyeska reasoning and adopted the private
attorney general exception. In Serrano v. Priest," the California Supreme Court
awarded attorney's fees to plaintiffs who established the unconstitutionality of the
public school financing system. Alyeska had just been decided.5 1 The Serrano court
explained that the Alyeska holding that the exception should not be adopted in the
absence of legislative guidance was "foremost in [its] mind. ' 52 The Serrano court
found that the private attorney general exception, adopted through the court's
equitable powers and without statutory authorization, was appropriate.53 The court
45. Friesen, supra note 24,1 10.01, at 10-3.
46. See, e.g., Doe v. Heintz, 526 A.2d 1318, 1323 (Conn. 1987) (denying the doctrine when a class of
indigent women and physicians prevailed in challenging the constitutionality of regulations restricting the funding
of abortions under the state's Medicaid program); Hamer v. Kirk, 356 N.E.2d 524, 528 (Ill. 1976) (relying on
Alyeska in rejecting the doctrine where taxpayers successfully sued for statutory violations in order to equalize the
level of assessment for each township) (affirmed in Fischer v. Brombolich, 616 N.E.2d 743,745 (11. App. Ct. 1993)
(stating it was up to the legislature to decide what suits deserve fee shifting)); Moore v. City of Pacific, 534 S.W.2d
486, 504-05 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (declining to adopt the doctrine for plaintiff who challenged a redistricting
ordinance violating constitutional "one man-one vote" principles); Jones v. Muir, 515 A.2d 855, 862 (Pa. 1986)
(rejecting doctrine where plaintiffs challenged the failure by the State of Pennsylvania to implement collection of
charges for a fund to provide citizens with medical treatment and rehabilitative services from car related injuries,
stating it was up to the legislature to award fees); Blue Sky Advocates v. State, 727 P.2d 644, 649 (Wash. 1986)
(refusing to adopt the exception when a non-profit sued the state's Attorney General for malpractice, stating it was
up to the legislature to fashion an exception to the American rule).
47. 526 A.2d 1318 (Conn. 1987).
48. Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984).
49. 526 A.2d at 1323.
50. 569 P.2d 1303, 1313-15 (Cal. 1977). Other decisions adopting the private attorney general doctrine
include: Hickel v. Southeast Conference, 868 P.2d 919, 923 (Alaska 1994) (awarding fees to plaintiffs challenging
a redistricting plan on constitutional grounds); Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 682 P.2d 524, 531 (Idaho 1984) (awarding fees
where plaintiffs challenged legislature's reapportionment scheme on state constitutional grounds, plaintiff's counsel
was a sole practitioner who undertook extensive expenses and demands to prosecute, and the state Attorney General
had been asked to defend the reapportionment scheme); Town of St. John v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 730 N.E.2d
240, 256 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2000) (adopting the private attorney general doctrine where taxpayers prevailed in a suit
challenging the constitutionality of the state's assessment of real property); Montanans for the Responsible Use of
the Sch.Trust v. State ex rel. Bd. of Land Comm'rs, 989 P.2d 800, 811-12 (Mont. 1999) (adopting the exception
where plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of fourteen statutes concerning Montana's school trust lands,
despite a state statute limiting an award of attorney's fees against the state to situations where the court finds the
state claim or defense frivolous or pursued in bad faith (MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-10-711 (1979)); Stewart v. Utah
Public Serv. Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759, 783 n.19 (Utah 1994) (adopting the exception where rate payers challenged
the constitutionality of UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-4-4.1(2) (1990) for its delegation of legislative powers to a private
party, the court limited the application of the private attorney general doctrine to extraordinary circumstances).
51. 421 U.S. 240.
52. 569 P.2d at 1313.
53. Id. at 1315.
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agreed with the plaintiffs that citizens in great numbers and across a broad spectrum
frequently have interests in common, but that these interests do not usually "involve
the fortunes of a single individual to the extent necessary to encourage their private
vindication in the courts." '54 Furthermore, the court agreed that although there are
offices and institutions (such as the office of the attorney general) "whose function
it is to represent the general public in such matters and to ensure proper
enforcement, for various reasons the burden of enforcement is not always adequately
carried by those offices and institutions, rendering some sort of private action
imperative."55 The court set out three factors to be considered in making its decision:
(1) the strength of societal importance of the public policy vindicated by the
litigation; (2) the necessity for private enforcement; and (3) the extent of the
resultant burden on the plaintiff, and the number of people standing to benefit from
the decision.56 The court explained that since the public policy at issue in the first
factor was grounded in the state constitution, and that the benefits were to be
enjoyed by a large number of the state's citizens, the trial court was justified in
applying the private attorney general doctrine and legislative approval was not
necessary."
After the Serrano decision, the California legislature enacted a private attorney
general statute to provide attorney's fees in public interest litigation.58 This statute
goes beyond the court's adoption of the exception based on state constitutional
grounds and allows the private attorney general doctrine in cases protecting public
interests in general. Under this statute, California has awarded attorney's fees in
cases similar to Johnson ."59
The opposite approaches taken by the United States Supreme Court and
California regarding the private attorney general exception present the essential
dilemma for state courts considering the issue. The interplay between the judiciary
and the legislature is a key consideration in addressing this doctrine, with the federal
courts bowing to legislative authority and California courts taking a leading role in
adopting the exception. It might appear that adoption of the exception could be
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1314.
57. Id. at 1315.
58. Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 1021.5 (West 1980). Section 1021.5 reads,
Upon motion, a court may award attorneys' fees to a successful party against one or more
opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right
affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has
been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial
burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by one public entity against another public
entity, are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of
justice be paid out of the recovery, if any. With respect to actions involving public entities, this
section applies to allowances against, but not in favor of, public entities, and no claim shall be
required to be filed therefor, unless one or more successful parties and one or more opposing
parties are public entities, in which case no claim shall be required to be filed therefor under Part
3 (commencing with Section 900) of Division 3.6 of Title 1 of the Government Code. Attorneys'
fees awarded to a public entity pursuant to this section shall not be increased or decreased by a
multiplier based upon extrinsic circumstances, as discussed in Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal.3d 25,
49.
59. See Comm. to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779,799 (Cal. 1981); Comm. to Defend
Reproductive Rights v. Rank, 198 Cal. Rptr. 630, 633 (1984).
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consistently limited to state constitutional claims, like Serrano, and rejected when
the underlying relief is based on statutory or public interest grounds, as in Alyeska;
however, state courts refusing to adopt the exception have done so even when the
underlying claims were based on the state constitution.W° In contrast, Arizona courts
went even further than the California court in Serrano and adopted the private
attorney general exception for public interest claims in general.6' Arizona has
limited the doctrine by not applying it where litigants seek only to recover money
for themselves or when they establish rights for citizens only through an attempt to
vindicate their individual rights without trying to benefit anyone else.62 Still, the
doctrine has been applied broadly in Arizona and allows fees for various public
interest suits, even against private defendants.63 Thus, state courts have not
consistently followed the federal example of deferring to the legislature when asked
to adopt the exception, nor have they precisely followed California's example of
adopting the exception without legislative guidance only when the claims are based
on state constitutional grounds. The state of the law in this area is therefore unsettled
and presents no clear road map for state courts to follow.
IV. RATIONALE AND ANALYSIS
In the Johnson I1 decision, the New Mexico Supreme Court joined the majority
of states by declining to adopt the private attorney general exception to the
American rule." The court found that New Mexico strictly adheres to the American
rule and thus it would be inappropriate for the court to abandon this rule or its
policies.65 Furthermore, the court explained that it feared that adopting the doctrine
would erode the policies of the American rule upon which New Mexico courts have
relied since their earliest days." The court appeared to reject the doctrine out of
hand, relying on arguments that do not withstand careful analysis. Buried within the
60. See supra, note 46 and Doe v. Heintz discussed supra this section.
61. Arnold v. Arizona Dep't of Health Services, 775 P.2d 521, 536-37 (Ariz. 1989) (adopting the exception
where plaintiffs sued on behalf of chronically mentally ill patients and prevailed in obtaining mental health services
for them, reasoning that since the American rule had been eroded by statutes and other judicial exceptions, the
adoption of the doctrine was not contrary to precedent).
62. See Kerr v. Waddell, 899 P.2d 162, 184 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (denying appellants' request for fees under
the private attorney general doctrine because appellants sought only to recover money for themselves, not to
advance the public interest); Chavarria v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 798 P.2d 1343, 1346-47 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1990) (denying attorney's fees under the private attorney general doctrine where plaintiff pressed her claim against
insurer for bad-faith denial of medical payments in order to recover a large award of damages for herself, not to
benefit the general public); Corley v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 775 P.2d 539, 541 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989)(denying attorney's fees under the doctrine when parolee established procedural rights for absolute discharge from
parole because he was attempting to vindicate only his own right of due process and the issue of absolute discharge
from parole is not of general societal importance).
63. See Yslava v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 845 F.Supp. 705, 711 (D. Ariz. 1993) (allowing attorney's fees
against aircraft company under the private attorney general doctrine for prevailing on state law claims for past and
future medical monitoring because the medical monitoring program would potentially benefit a large number of
people); Arizona Ctr. for Law in Public Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 173 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (assessing
attorney's fees under the private attorney general doctrine against both state and private defendants where plaintiffs
successfully challenged the validity of legislation relinquishing state's interest in riverbed lands and landowners
who claimed interests in the lands intervened as additional defendants).
64. See Appendix infra.
65. 127 N.M. 654,658-59,986 P.2d 450,454-55.
66. Id. at 455-59.
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opinion, however, is recognition of the dilemma of determining proper legislative
and judicial roles illustrated in the opposite approaches taken by the United States
Supreme Court and California. It is that dilemma that presents a more reasoned
justification for the court's result.
A. Stare Decisis
The Johnson 11 court began its discussion of the private attorney general doctrine
with a look at New Mexico's adherence to the American rule.67 The court stated that
New Mexico has "strictly adhered to (the American] rule since [its] territorial days,"
and if the court were to adopt the private attorney general doctrine it would be
departing from established precedent.6" The court reasoned that it must rely on the
doctrine of stare decisis in determining whether to adopt the private attorney general
exception to the American rule.69 Stare decisis is the judicial principle of relying on
previous precedent, and any departure from it requires special justification.7" In
determining whether to depart from precedent, the court stated that it evaluates the
following factors: whether the precedent is so unworkable as to be intolerable,
whether parties justifiably relied on the precedent so that reversing it would create
an undue hardship, whether principles of law have developed to such an extent to
leave the old rule a "remnant of abandoned doctrine," and whether the facts have
changed in the interval from the time the old rule was adopted so that the old rule
can no longer be justified.71 The court explained that the precedent it was being
asked to depart from was a line of cases setting out the policies underlying the
American rule.72 The two American rule policies upon which New Mexico courts
rely on in attorney's fees decisions are (1 )_protection of equal access to the courts
and (2) preservation of judicial resources.n Since these policies are still important
today, and because most state constitutional jurisprudence in New Mexico concerns
either criminal matters, where attorney's fees are not at issue, or civil rights cases,
where state statutes authorize attorney's fees, the court stated that the American rule
is not so "unworkable as to be intolerable. ' 74 Thus, the court held that it would not
abandon the precedent underlying the American rule or its policies. 5
The court's stare decisis analysis of the American rule is flawed because the court
is not relying on a previously decided case. "Stare decisis" means "to stand by
things decided" and is the "doctrine of precedent, under which it is necessary for a
court to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in
67. Id. at 663, 986 P.2d at 458. The standard of review in this case was de novo. Reviews of attorney fee
awards are generally for an abuse of discretion, but the district court rejected the private attorney general doctrine
as a matter of law, which required a review of the application of the law to the facts de novo. Id. at 656-57, 986 P.2d
at 452-53.
68. Id. at 657, 986 P.2d at 453.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 657-58, 986 P.2d at 453-54.
72. Id. at 657, 986 P.2d at 453.
73. Id. at 658, 986 P.2d at 454.
74. Id. at 659, 986 P.2d at 455. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-13(D) (1978). New Mexico's Human Rights
Act states, "In any action or proceeding under this section if the complainant prevails, the court in its discretion may
allow actual damages and reasonable attorney's fees, and the state shall be liable the same as a private person."
75. 127 N.M. at 663, 986 P.2d at 459.
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litigation. 76 Stare decisis is employed when a court is faced with whether it should
overrule an established precedent because of special and convincing justifications.
The United States Supreme Court, for example, in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,77 considered whether the holding in Roe v.
Wade 71 should be reaffirmed or overturned and explained that the rule of stare
decisis is necessary to establish continuity under the Constitution, but that a prior
judicial ruling should be overturned if it "should come to be seen so clearly as error
that its enforcement was for that very reason doomed. ' 79 The Court proceeded to set
out factors to consider when faced with the proposition of overturning a previous
case-the same factors the Johnson II court explained it had considered in deciding
whether to depart from the American rule.' New Mexico courts have adopted the
Casey factors for courts to consider in a stare decisis analysis and explicitly
recognize that stare decisis involves analysis of a prior judicial decision. 81 The New
Mexico Court of Appeals has explained that under stare decisis, courts will "apply
the rules of law previously announced by courts of the same jurisdiction to cases
involving similar facts," and thus when a previous case only announces general
principles addressing a certain issue, it will not be considered precedent for those
principles.82
A stare decisis analysis applies with respect to prior decisions and does not make
sense without a prior decision that the court is considering overruling. Prior to
Johnson I1, the private attorney general exception had never been addressed by New
Mexico courts. Nevertheless, the Johnson 11 court applied the doctrine of stare
decisis to its consideration of upholding New Mexico's adherence to the American
rule and its policies.8 3 Since the court was not basing its stare decisis analysis on a
previous case with similar facts, its analysis clouds the basis for this decision.
Adopting an exception to a rule does not overrule a case, and therefore when a court
accepts or rejects an exception to a rule it should look at policy issues, not at stare
decisis factors. Thus, the court's misplaced stare decisis reasoning results in a
holding that is incorrectly justified by giving American rule policies the same status
as a prior holding and in effect giving the policies more weight than they deserve.
B. American Rule Policies
The Johnson 11 court next discussed whether it could adopt the private attorney
general exception without departing from the American rule's policies of ensuring
76. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1414 (7th ed. 1999).
77. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
78. 410 U.S. 113, 164-66(1973).
79. 505 U.S. at 854 (holding that doctrine of stare decisis requires reaffirmance of Roe v. Wade's essential
holding recognizing a woman's right to choose to have an abortion).
80. Id. at 854.
81. City of Las Vegas v. Oman, 110 N.M. 425, 433-34, 796 P.2d 1121, 1129-30 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding
in part that previous decision announced only general principles and did not resolve all potential issues presented
by plaintiffs on basis of stare decisis, so district court was not precluded from receiving evidence). See also Hicks
v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 591, 544 P.2d 1153, 1156 (1975) (holding that stare decisis principles should only apply to
cases considering prior decisions).
82. 110 N.M. at 433-34,796 P.2d at 1129-30.
83. 127 N.M. at 657-59, 986 P.2d at 453-55.
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equal access to the courts and not burdening judicial resources. " The court
described how currently recognized exceptions to the American rule in New Mexico
have not eroded the rule's policies. 5 First, New Mexico's bad faith exception allows
fee awards against parties whose conduct occurs before the court or is in direct
defiance of the court's authority. 6 The court explained that this exception is
consistent with the policies of the American rule because it makes the courts more
efficient and does not discourage the losing litigant from fairly prosecuting or
defending a claim. 87 Second, the court found that New Mexico's common fund
attorney fee awards are not truly fee shifting because they are deducted from the
fund that was protected and thus do not violate the principles of the American rule.88
Third, the court found that attorney's fees awarded in wrongful injunction cases are
part of the damages and thus do not constitute a fee shifting exception.89 Finally, the
court reasoned that allowing fees in divorce, child custody, and fiduciary duty cases
where statutes give courts the power to adjudicate these matters is consistent with
the American rule because it promotes equal access to the courts by protecting
vulnerable parties and does not burden judicial resources because courts can "draw
guidance from a number of cases that have analyzed and applied these exceptions
over time. '
1. Equal Access to the Courts
The Johnson II court found that unlike these recognized exceptions, the private
attorney general doctrine is not consistent with the American rule's policies and
therefore the court will not adopt it.91 The court reasoned that the exception would
prevent equal access to the courts because "it lacks sufficient guidelines to prevent
courts from treating similarly situated parties differently and could easily result in
decisions that favor a particular class of private litigants while unduly discouraging
the government from mounting a good faith defense. "92
The court failed to recognize, however, that the private attorney general doctrine
is not only consistent with the policy of encouraging access to the courts, it was
adopted for that specific purpose. The doctrine was developed to encourage suits
that would protect constitutional rights beyond those protected under federal law.
Its purpose is "to provide an incentive for representing litigants who assert publicly
favored claims." 93 In adopting the private attorney general exception, one court
84. 127 N.M. at 662-63, 986 P.2d at 458-59.
85. Id. at 659-62, 986 P.2d at 455-57. See Turpin v. Smedinghoff, 117 N.M. 598, 601, 874 P.2d 1262, 1265
(1994) (holding that attorney's fees would not be awarded under the bad faith or common fund theories where
defendant sued to dissolve partnership, stating: "This Court has been reluctant to extend awards of attorney's fees
except in limited circumstances.").
86. State v. Baca 120 N.M. 1,6-7,896 P.2d 1148, 1153-54 (explaining New Mexico's long-time recognition
of the bad faith exception to the American rule).
87. Johnson I1, 127 N.M. at 659, 986 P.2d at 455.
88. Id. at 660, 986 P.2d at 456. See also Las Vegas Ry. & Power Co. v. Trust Co., 17 N.M. 286, 291, 126
P. 1005, 1010 (1912) (recognizing common fund exception), error dismissed, 238 U.S. 645 (1914).
89. Id. at 66 0-61, 986 P.2d at 456.
90. Id. at 661, 986 P.2d at 457.
91. Id. at 662, 986 P.2d at 458.
92. Id. at 663, 986 P.2d at 459.
93. DeWills Interiors, Inc. v. Dines, 678 P.2d 80, 86 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984).
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noted that their decision, "if anything,... promotes meritorious litigation by those
who otherwise may not be able to afford to enforce their constitutional rights."94
Furthermore, since the private attorney general exception is almost always applied
against government entities, its adoption does not discourage good-faith litigation
on the part of poor plaintiffs.
2. Protecting Public Funds
Underlying the Johnson 11 court's argument that the exception may discourage
meritorious defenses is, perhaps, a concern for protecting the public treasury. City
of Riverside v. Rivera highlights the concern that costs could be prohibitive in
constitutional cases involving an expanded right to fees.95 In that case, the United
States Supreme Court upheld a district court decision granting fees under section
1988 that were seven times the amount of compensatory and punitive damages
awarded. 96 The court reasoned that "[b]ecause damages awards do not reflect fully
the public benefit advanced by civil rights litigation, Congress did not intend for
fees in civil rights cases, unlike most private law cases, to depend on obtaining
substantial monetary relief."97 Since courts under section 1988 can award fees that
may far exceed the damages award in a case, it is certainly possible for defendants
to be discouraged from mounting proper defenses. Thus, the private attorney general
exception could arguably place too large a weapon in the hands of plaintiffs, forcing
defendants to settle.
Courts adopting the exception have, however, dealt with this argument in two
ways. Some courts have explained that the state will not necessarily be discouraged
from mounting meritorious defenses since the litigation is intended to bring the state
agency back on track with constitutional regulations and, after complying with the
substantive ruling, the state agency "likely can justifiably oppose constitutional
attacks."98 Other courts, adopting the exception on state constitutional grounds, have
explained that since the public policies at issue were grounded in the state
constitution and the interests furthered were constitutional in nature, the importance
of protecting state constitutional rights overrides concern for the effect on
defendants of potentially large fee awards. 99
3. Preserving Judicial Resources
The Johnson 1H court found that the private attorney general exception would not
preserve judicial resources because it would force courts to "engage in a fact-
specific reexamination of the merits of a case to determine the significance and
scope of the rights that have been protected."'' "° This argument lacks merit because
courts are already required to award attorney's fees in cases falling under the many
94. Town of St. John, 730 N.E.2d 240, 246 (Ind. Tax 2000).
95. 477 U.S. 561,574, 576-78 (1986) (rejecting the proposition that fee awards under section 1988 should
necessarily be proportionate to the amount of damages a civil rights plaintiff actually recovers).
96. Id. at 565-67.
97. Id. at 575.
98. See Town of St. John, 730 N.E.2d at 265.
99. See Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303, 1314 (Cal. 1977).
100. 127 N.M. at 663, 986 P.2d at459.
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statutory and common law exceptions to the American rule. There are well-
established criteria for the courts to evaluate and calculate those awards and
adopting the private attorney general doctrine would not require new procedures.'
Furthermore, not only do courts have experience calculating attorney's fees,
"determining fees is part of the Court's basic function."102
C. The Court/Legislature Dilemma
While the foregoing rationales for the Johnson 11 court's rejection of the private
attorney general exception seem to lack merit when subjected to closer scrutiny,
buried within the opinion are two rationales that are perhaps more compelling. The
court expresses a dual concern (1) that the private attorney general doctrine requires
the court to "look beyond the proceedings before it to determine which rights are of
more societal importance than others, which classes of litigants have protected such
rights, and which classes of people have benefited from such protection;' 03 and (2)
that the court must be particularly sensitive to "the necessity to protect public
revenues unless their diversion is specifically authorized by statute."" Thus, out of
deference to legislative policy judgments concerning the relative importance of
various rights, and out of concern for judicially imposed influence on the public
treasury, the court opted for the federal legislative-deference model of Alyeska,'°5
rather than the California judicial leadership model of Serrano.'"
New Mexico might have adopted the private attorney general exception only for
cases based on state constitutional grounds, as the Serrano court did, in order to
avoid having courts decide which rights are more important than others since all
constitutional rights would be given the same importance. Such a ruling, however,
might open too broadly the door to the public treasury. Under such a rule, public
funds would be available for parties with state constitutional claims who could
adequately afford the cost of litigation against the state, as well as to those
individuals, like the plaintiffs in the Johnson case, who do not have such resources.
It is perhaps, this kind of concern for the judicial invasion of the public
treasury-without legislative authorization---that drove the conclusion in Johnson
HI.
V. IMPLICATIONS
There is a certain irony in the New Mexico Supreme Court's rejection of the
private attorney general exception to the American rule. Throughout the country,
state courts have been asked to assume a primary role in securing civil rights in the
post-Warren Court era where the United States Supreme Court has interpreted
101. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Dexter Consol. Sch., 129 N.M. 436,447, 10 P.3d 115, 126 (2000) (explaining how
New Mexico uses the lodestar method to calculate attorney's fees under section 1988 and stating what records are
necessary for the party seeking a fee award to provide).
102. Town of St. John, 730 N.E.2d at 265.
103. 127 N.M. at 662, 986 P.2d at 458.
104. Id. (quoting Torrance County Mental Health Program, Inc. v. New Mexico Health and Env't Dep't, 113
N.M. 593, 600, 830 P.2d 145, 152 (1992)).
105. 421 U.S. 240(1975).
106. 569 P.2d 1303 (Cal. 1977).
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individual rights secured by the federal Constitution in a more narrow fashion.' °7
While over-reliance on the federal doctrines that grew out of the Warren era have
left state constitutional law underdeveloped in many states, New Mexico has been
in the lead in the development of its state constitutional rights jurisprudence-giving
broader protection to rights under its state constitution than is afforded under the
federal Constitution. 0 8 Indeed, in a recent Symposium examining Western state
constitutions in the New Mexico Law Review in 1998,109 some of the contributing
authors focused on the recent New Mexico Supreme Court decisions using the "New
Mexico Constitution as a tool for safeguarding individual rights."" 0 It is ironic that,
during the very era when the New Mexico court is expanding the availability of
judicially enforceable rights under its state constitution, it fails to facilitate and
encourage the bringing of such cases through the adoption of the private attorney
general theory of attorney's fees.
Furthermore, the holding in Johnson 11 demonstrates the dilemma faced by
litigants who may have similar federal and state constitutional claims and would, for
tactical reasons, prefer to remain in state court and remain free from federal court
review. Because section 1988 provides a chance to recover attorney's fees for
federal constitutional claims, litigants may be tempted to pursue their federal claims
at the expense of their state claims. Such claims brought in state court, however, are
often subject to removal to federal court,"' and in any event would be subject to
certiorari review in the United States Supreme Court, whereas state constitutional
claims are neither subject to removal nor Supreme Court review."' Thus, such
litigants are faced with the dilemma of pursuing a possibly more satisfactory result
in state court, under the state constitution, but at the considerable cost of foregoing
the right to attorney's fees, which would be available if the litigant sought similar
constitutional relief under the federal Constitution.
VI. CONCLUSION
The New Mexico Supreme Court in Johnson H refused to adopt the private
attorney general exception to the American rule. In so doing, the court struggled
with the difficult task of defining the proper dividing line between legislative and
judicial authority over the expansion of the right to attorney's fees. In deciding to
reject the private attorney general exception, however, the court may have inhibited
107. Friesen, supra note 24,1 1.01, at 1-3.
108. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 Sw. L J. 951, 957 (1981) ("As the federal
constitutional guarantees grew during the Warren Court years, the protection of individual rights under the state
constitutions almost came to a halt.").
109. See G. Alan Tarr and Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Western State Constitutions in the American
Constitutional Tradition, 28 N.M. L. REv. 191 (Spring 1998); Jennifer Cutcliffe Juste, Constitutional Law-The
Effect of State Constitutional Interpretation on New Mexico's Civil and Criminal Procedure-State v. Gomez, 28
N.M. L REv. 355, 377 (1998).
110. Juste, supra note 109, at 377.
Ill. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994) (noting that "Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress,
any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction,
may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place where such action is pending.").
112. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1031, 1040-41 (1983) (explaining that the Supreme Court does not have
jurisdiction when state courts decide cases based on adequate and independent state grounds).
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the growth of New Mexico's state constitutional jurisprudence, at the very time it
has been signaling its willingness to expand state constitutional rights beyond those
conferred by the federal Constitution.
ALLISON CRIST
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